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Abstract
We consider a delegation problem with a potentially uninformed agent when the principal
cannot use monetary payments. If the bias between the principal and the agent is large, then
the optimal delegation set is an interval. When the bias is small or medium however, the
optimal delegation set is no longer connected. It can be one of two types: with an interval and
low option, the other with two intervals. In all cases the agent has less discretion. However, in
the case of medium biases the principal delegates in a wider range than in the case of informed
agent. In all cases the agent will be given more freedom if he is more informed.
Introduction
Consider a situation in which a principal delegates decisions to an agent but limits the agents
discretion. The rationale for delegation is that the agent is better informed than the principal,
though in reality the agent may not be competent. For example, in the decision making process
within a rm, a CEO delegates investment decisions within certain limits to a manager who may
or may not have the appropriate information. Such a situation is likely to occur with a junior
manager, when it is prohibitively costly to collect information, or when the agent observes the
realization of the pilot project to acquire information. The principal does not know the outcome
of the pilot. When designing the delegation limits, the principal takes into account that the agent
may be uninformed.
This paper studies a delegation problem when the agent with some positive probability does not
have private information and the principal cannot use monetary payments. Instead the principal
selects a set of actions from which the agent is required to choose - a delegation set. The principal
faces a trade-o¤between her desire to use the agents information and exerting control over decisions.
We show that if the bias between the principal and the agent is su¢ ciently large, the optimal
delegation set is an interval. When the bias is small or medium, the optimal delegation set is no
longer connected. For small biases it consists of two intervals. For medium biases it consists of
an interval and low option. The principal wants to exert more control over the uninformed agent
compared to the informed agent. Therefore, in all cases there are fewer choices available for the
agent. However, in the case of medium biases the range of the delegation set is larger than in the
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case of the informed agent. The principal distorts the delegation set downwards in order to benet,
at least partially, from the information in the low-end of the distribution. In all cases the more
informed the agent, the more freedom given.
The constrained delegation framework has recently become popular to analyze the variety of
economic situations: the limits placed on Central Banks monetary or exchange rate policy, price
limits in regulation, the House regulations on policies that a delegated committee may choose, tari¤
levels etc. This literature was pioneered by Holmström (1977) and (1984) who proves under general
conditions that there exist an optimal delegation set. Holmström (1984) and Armstrong (1994)
assume that the optimal delegation set is an interval. Following this tradition most of the literature
focused on interval delegation with informed agent. Melumad and Shibano (1991), Martimort and
Semenov (2006), Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Kovac and Mylovanov (2009) and Amador and
Bagwell (2011) present di¤erent su¢ cient conditions under which the optimal delegation set is an
interval. Frankel (2012) shows that in the case of multiple decisions, half-space analog of an interval
delegation set is optimal in the case of a normal distribution of types and quadratic payo¤s. Non-
interval delegation was considered in Melumad and Shibano (1991) who presented condition on
payo¤ functions of the principal and the agent in order to have non-interval optimal delegation
set. The ideal decisions of the principal should be higher than the ideal decisions for the agent
for some states and lower for others. Martimort and Semenov (2006) and Kovac and Mylovanov
(2009) pointed out conditions on distributions of types when the optimal delegation set can be non-
interval. This paper shows that with conventional payo¤s and distributions, non-connectedness of
the optimal delegation set may arise if the agent may be uninformed.
In the literature on signaling games Austen-Smith (1994) established that the possibility of an
uninformed sender makes information transmission possible for a wider range of conicts between
the receiver and the sender compare to the cases when the sender is informed. The reason for this
arising is di¤erent from ours; the low - type sender pools with the uninformed sender. This leads
to a more favorable action for the low-type sender which makes it is easier for high - type sender
to separate himself than in the case when the receiver is sure that the sender is informed. Lewis
and Sappington (1993) consider the optimal contract with the possibility of ignorance when the
principal may use transfers to elicit information. The payo¤ of the principal does not depend on
the information parameter (private values). In this framework there is always a discontinuity in the
optimal output. The optimal contract exhibits pooling and when costs are high the output is lower
than in the standard second best.
The Model
A principal (she) delegates the making of a decision d 2 R to an agent (he). The payo¤s of the
principal and the agent are VP (d; ) and VA (d; ) correspondingly, where the state of the world
 2  = ;  is drawn from the distribution with non-atomic, continuous density function f ()
and cumulative density function F () : The principal does not observe . The game is as follows:
1. The principal chooses a compact delegation set D  R.
2. With probability 1   p the agent learns the state ; with probability p the agent remains
uninformed. The probability p is a common knowledge, but the principal is unaware if the
agent is informed.
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3. The agent chooses d 2 D:
A delegation set D is optimal if it maximizes the principals expected payo¤ among all compact
sets. Denote by d0 2 D the choice of the non-informed agent and by Dinf the set of choices for the
informed agent, D = fDinf ; d0g. If the agent learns that the state is  then his payo¤ is VA (d () ; ) ;
where
d () = arg max
d2Dinf
VA (d; )
and the expected payo¤ of the uninformed agent is
R

VA (d0; ) dF (): The principals expected
payo¤ is denoted by V (D) :
V (D) = p
Z

VP (d0; ) dF () + (1  p)
Z

VP (d () ; ) dF ():
We denote the rst (uninformed) part of the principals payo¤ as V0(D) and the second (in-
formed) part as Vinf(D) so that V (D) = V0(D) + Vinf(D): The choices of the agent maximize his
payo¤ in the delegation set. If the agent is informed that the state is  2  then
VA (d () ; )  VA (d (0) ; ) for all ; 0 2 : (1)
When the agent does not observe the state, he prefers d0 to any other outcome d (
0) 2 Dinf :Z

VA (d0; ) dF () 
Z

VA (d (
0) ; ) dF () for all ; 0 2 : (2)
Finally, if the agent observes the state ; he prefers d () to d0 if
VA (d () ; )  VA (d0; ) : (3)
We focus on quadratic specications of payo¤s,
VA (d; ) =  1
2
(d  )2 and VP (d; ) =  1
2
(d     b)2 ;
where the parameter b  0 is the bias between the principal and the agent. The bias b is a common
knowledge. The delegation sets have the form D =
n
n[
i=1
Di

; d0
o
; where Di =

di; di

; i = 1; :::; n
are closed intervals, di  di < di+1  di+1 for all i = 1; :::; n  1: The choice of the informed agent
 is the following: if  2 Di =

di; di

then d () =  and VA (d () ; ) = 0: If  2

di;
di+di+1
2

then d () = di and VA (d () ; ) =  12
 
di   
2
: If  2

di+di+1
2
; di+1

then d () = di+1 and
VA (d () ; ) =  12
 
di+1   
2
: The xed decision E() + b maximizes the payo¤ of uninformed
agent. The expected payo¤ of the principal is
V (D) = V0(D) + Vinf(D) =  p
2
Z 

(d0      b)2 dF ()  1  p
2
Z d1

(d1      b)2 dF ()+
+
Xn
i=1
Z di
di
b2dF () +
Xn
i=1
Z di+di+1
2
di
(di      b)2 dF ()+
3
+
Xn
i=1
Z di+1
di+di+1
2
 
di+1      b
2
dF () +
Z 
dn
 
dn      b
2
dF ()
)
:
The distribution of states satisfy the following
Assumption 1 The function F () is log-concave and for all  2  the function f()   bf 0() is
positive for all  2  and weakly decreasing in .
Martimort and Semenov (2006) show that if the agent is always informed, F () is log-concave and
f()  bf 0()  0 for all  then the optimal delegation set is an interval. Examples of distributions
satisfying this Assumption are uniform distributions and exponential distributions.
Remark 1 The delegation problem has the equivalent mechanism design formulation. Denote bye the expanded state space [ff?gg ; where f?g corresponds to the state when the agent is unin-
formed. For each state  2 e the principal chooses a decision q() 2 D; where q() is a measurable
function from e to R: The corresponding delegation set is D = fq()g20 = fq(); q (f?g)g2 :
Remark 2 We can consider more general utility for the agent: VA = vA(d   ; ); where vA is
a single-peaked function given : With appropriate changes, the results also can be extended to
generalized quadratic payo¤ for the principal VP =  r()(d   yP ())2; where yP () is the ideal
policy for the principal (see also Alonso and Matouschek, 2008).
Results
The delegation is valuable if the principal benets from delegating decision - making to the agent
instead of choosing the decision by herself. Our rst result establishes the possible types of the
optimal delegation sets when the delegation is valuable.
Proposition 1 If p < 1 and b <  E() then the delegation is valuable and the optimal delegation
set is one of the following types:
1. Interval delegation: D =

d0; 

; where d0  E() + b;
2. Interval and point delegation: D = fd1g[

d0; 

; where E()  d0 < E() + b and d1 + d0 =
2E();
3. Two - intervals delegation: D =

d1; d1
 [ d0;  ; where d1  E()  d0 < E() + b and
d1 + d0 = 2E():
The optimal delegation sets are presented on Figure 1 a-c. The interesting feature of delegation
sets of type 2 and 3 is that they are not connected. In case 2 d1 and d0 are equidistant from E():
In case 3 d1 and d0 are equidistant from E(): The principal want to limit the choice of uninformed
agent. This agent has the ideal policy E(): This policy is too low for the principal who wants in
this case the execution of the policy E() + b: Hence, she introduces a gap in the delegation set.
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c. Two intervals delegation d. Delegation with informedagent
D
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Proof: Delegation is valuable if the payo¤ of uninformed principal  1
2
R 

(E()  )2 dF () is
smaller than maxDV (D): Consider an interval delegation set eD = E() + b;  :Then V ( eD)  
 1
2
R 

(E()  )2 dF ()

= 1
2
R 
E()+b
(E()     b) (E()   + b) dF () > 0: Thus, delegation is
valuable.
We will prove the Proposition 1 in few Lemmas. Denote by d( ) = lim0! 0 d(
0) and by
d(+) = lim0!+0 d(
0):
Lemma 3 d0 2 fd (E()); d+(E())g :
Proof. We re-write (2) as
(d (0)  d0) (d (0) + d0   2E())  0
and (3) as
(d (0)  d0) (d (0) + d0   20)  0:
Summing up these inequalities we obtain (d (0)  d0) (0   E())  0: Hence, for any " > 0 we have
d(E() + ")  d0  d(E()  "): Taking the limit we obtain d0 2 fd (E()); d+(E())g :
By this Lemma, if there exist k such that E() 2 Dk then d0 = d(E()). If on the other hand
for some i we have E() 2  di; di+1 then d0 is either di or di+1.
We introduce "  transformation D(") of the set D on the interval (Dk; Dk+1) ; where Dk =
dk; dk

and Dk+1 =

dk+1; dk+1

: Consider the sets D0k =

dk; dk + "

and D0k+1 =

dk+1   "; dk+1

such that dk + " < dk+1   ": The derivative of Vi(D(")) with respect to " evaluated at " = 0 is
greater than zero if
b(2F (0)  F (0  )  F (0 + )) 
Z 0
0 
F ()d +
Z 0+
0
F ()d  0: (4)
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The Assumption 1 provides a su¢ cient condition for (4). Indeed, consider the function
 (t) = b(2F (0)  F (0   t)  F (0 + t)) 
Z 0
0 t
F ()d +
Z 0+t
0
F ()d;
where t 2 [0;] :We have  (0) = 0 and 0 (t) = b(f(0  t) + f(0+ t)) F (0  t) +F (0+ t): Then
00 (0) = 0 and 00 (t) > 0.
Lemma 4 The optimal delegation set has at most two disjoint intervals.
Proof. Assume rst that there exist i such that d0 2

di; dk+1
	
: If for k < i there are disjoint
setsDk =

dk; dk

andDk+1 =

dk+1; dk+1

then we take "  transformationD(") ofD in the interval
(Dk; Dk+1) : Because d0 =2 Dk [Dk+1 we have V0(D) = V0(D(")) and, therefore, V (D(")) > V (D),
which contradicts the optimality of D: The case d0 = di+1 is similar. If d0 = d(E()) then using
the same considerations we show that D is an interval.
In order to compare the delegations sets in Proposition 1 with the delegation set when the agent
is always informed (p = 0) we remind the well-known result (see Martimort and Semenov, 2006).
Lemma 5 If p = 0 then the optimal delegation set is an interval D =

; 

, where  is implicitly
dened by
 = b+ E ( j   ) : (5)
Proof. By Lemma 4 the optimal delegation set is an interval, D =

1; 

. The principals
expected prot is
V (D) = Vinf(D) =  
Z 1

(1      b)2dF () 
Z 
1
b2dF ():
The rst-order condition for 1 leads to (5).
The optimal delegation set with informed agent is depicted in Figure 1 d. Lemma 3 shows that
d0 2 fd (E()); d+(E())g : We can now prove that d0 = d+(E():
Lemma 6 d0 = d+(E()  :
Proof. a) Let D = fDinf ; d0g is the optimal delegation set. We prove rst that d0  :
Assume to the contrary that d0 < 
: Consider the optimal delegation set D dened in Lemma 5.
The set D0 = D [
nbo is feasible for the program (P) : Because of the optimality of D we have
V0(D) + Vinf(D)  V0(D0) + Vinf(D0): By Lemma 5 we have Vinf(D0)  Vinf(D): Therefore it must
be that V0(D0)  V0(D): This leads to (d0   ) (d0 +    2E ()  2b)  0. Suppose that d0 < 
then we have d0 + 
  2E () + 2b or  > b+ E () ; which contradicts (5). Therefore, d0  :
b) We prove now that d0 = d+(E(): Assume to the contrary that d0 = d (E() < d+(E():
Consider delegation sets D  = fDinf ; d (E())g and D+ = fDinf ; d (E())g : Since Vinf(D+) =
Vinf(D
 ) we have
V (D ) V (D+) = V0(D ) V0(D+) =
 
d+(E())  d (E())d+(E()) + d (E())
2
  E()  b

:
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Thus V (D ) > V (D+) if and only if d
+(E())+d (E())
2
> E()+b: In this case, since d0 = d (E()) >
; we have for all  2 [d (E()); d+(E())] ;  > : Then if we consider the delegation set eD =
f[d (E()); d+(E())] [Dinf ; E()g we have Vi( eD) > Vi(D): New uninformed option E() > do
thus, V0( eD) > V0(D): Contradiction. Hence, d0 = d+(E()):
From Lemma 4 and Lemma 6 it follows that the optimal contract belongs to one of types 1-3 of
Proposition 1. Note rst that for types 2 and 3 d
+(E())+d (E())
2
 E(): Indeed, if d+(E())+d (E())
2
>
E() then d0 < E() and d0  : As in Lemma 6 b) we obtain a strict improvement. Thus,
d+(E())+d (E())
2
 E():
Lemma 7 If p < 1 then d0 < E() + b:
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider a set Dinf = [1; 
0  ] [ [0 + ; 2] : We introduce   transformation D of Dinf :
D = [; 0   + ] [ 0 +  + ;  : The derivative of Vinf(D) with respect to  evaluated at
 = 0 is positive when
f(0 + t)  bf 0(0 + t)  f(0   t)  bf 0(0   t) for all t 2 [0;] :
This condition is satised by Assumption 1.
We now can prove the Proposition 1. By Lemma 3 there are two possibilities; either the op-
timal delegation set is an interval D = f[1; 2] ; E()g, or it has the form D = f[1; 0  ] [
[0 + ; 2] ; 
0 + g: Note that 2 = : If 2 < ; then the delegation sets D = f

1; 

; E()g and
D = f[1; 0  ] [

0 + ; 

; 0 + g strictly dominate respective delegation sets.
If the optimal delegation set is an interval then it is of the type 1. Assume thatD = ([1; 
0  ][
0 + ; 

; 0+) and d
+(E())+d (E())
2
6= E(): Because d0 < E()+b by Lemma 7 there exist  > 0
such that d0+  E()+b: Then the   transformation of [1; 0  ][

0 + ; 

improves both V0
and Vinf : Contradiction. Therefore in both cases 2 and 3 the intervals of delegation are equidistant
from E(): Note that when the intervals of delegation are equidistant from E() we cannot improve
by introducing the   transformation because d0 changes from d0 = d+(E() to d0 = d (E()
which is further away from E() + b and, therefore, the component V0 sharply decreases.
The parameters of delegation sets in Proposition 1 satisfy the following inequalities:
Corollary 1 If p > 0 for corresponding types in Proposition 1 we have
1. d0 > 
;
2. d1   < d0;
3. d1 = 
:
Proof. See Appendix.
For the delegation set of the type 1 in Proposition 1 if p > 0 we haveD is strictly contained inD:
Because of the positive probability of the agent being uniformed the information is less important
for the principal than when the agent is always informed and she wants to exert more control over
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decisions when the agent is uninformed. Thus, she moves the boundary of delegation closer to the
optimal policy of the uninformed agent, E() + b: Thus, the principal gives less discretion to the
agent. This is generally true for all types of the delegation sets. For the type 2, the delegation set
consists of the set

d0; 

and the option d1  : The principal wants to use information below d0;
but she cannot delegate to medium types because she wants to limit the choice of uninformed agent.
Thus, she has to distort the delegation set even below the optimal boundary for the informed agent
case : For the delegation set of the type 3, the principal makes use of information held by upper
and lower tails of distribution still exerting control for medium range.
We consider now the comparative statics with respect to the bias. The main goal is to determine
which type of the delegation set is optimal for di¤erent ranges of biases. Lets x the bias b and con-
sider the optimal delegation setD of type i in Proposition 1. By this Proposition the optimal delega-
tion set of type i is uniquely determined by the outcome d0. Dene Vi (d0; b) - the corresponding ex-
pected payo¤of the principal and d(i)0 (b) as the maximizer of Vi (d0; b) : d
(i)
0 (b) = arg maxd0 Vi (d0; b) :
Dene also b1 as the solution of
2E()  d(2)0 (b1) = b
and b2 is dened by
b2 =
1
F (E())
Z E()

F () d: (6)
The bias b2 is such that the optimal delegation set for the informed agent is

E(); 

. We have
the following:
Proposition 2 If p 2 (0; 1) then there exist b1 and b2; b2 > b2 > b1 such that:
a) (Interval delegation) if b  b2 then the optimal delegation set is of type 1;
b) (Interval and point delegation) if b 2 [b1; b2) then the optimal delegation set is of type 2;
c) (Two - intervals delegation) if b 2 [0; b1) then the optimal delegation set is of type 3.
Proof (See Appendix)
When the bias b is large then the delegation set with uninformed agent is D =

d0; 
  D =
; 

and d0 > 
 for p > 0: Of course, when the bias is su¢ ciently large, then the optimal
delegation set is a point fE() + bg regardless of the agent is informed or not. If the principal faces
only uninformed agent she wants to implement E() + b: When there is a non-zero probability of
the agent being informed, the principal restricts the optimal delegation set towards this optimal
decision. For medium levels of bias, the same principle applies and d0 > 
: However, the principal
gives the low types the option d1 = 2E()  d0: She cannot neglect these types as the case of large
biases because the low types are now more aligned with the principal. The principal faces additional
trade-o¤ between delegating to informed types and controlling the uninformed agent. This moves
the policy d0 towards E()+b: Correspondingly, the option d1 optimally is below 
: If d1 > 
 then
the principal can do better by adding extra interval of delegation [; d1] : This exactly happens
when the bias is small. Note that the principal delegates in the same range as for informed agent
problem, but now she excludes intermediate choices. By doing this she is able to move the choice
of uninformed agent towards his ideal point.
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Holmström (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) have shown that the agent will be given
more freedom when he is more informed. For this purpose they use the normally distributed state
of the world:   N(; 2) and consider the comparative statics of interval delegation when 2
decreases. Another way to test this hypothesis is to check if the optimal delegation sets are larger
when the probability 1  p of the agent being informed increases.
Proposition 3 If D(pk); k = 1; 2 are the optimal delegation set when the probability not being
uninformed are p1 < p2; then D(p1) % D(p2):
Indeed, then the agent is more informed, then informed component of principals payo¤ is
relatively more important - it has relatively more weight. As Figure 1 shows in this case the
optimal delegation set is closer to the set D =

; 

:
Uniform example: Consider uniformly distributed types   Uni [0; 1] : In this case the
optimal delegation set with informed agent is D =

2b; 

and delegation is valuable when b < 1
2
:
All three types of delegation sets are determined by corresponding d0: We have
d
(1)
0 = b 
p
1  p + 2
r
b2 +
p
(1  p)2 ;
d
(2)
0 = b 
p
1  p +
2
s
b2 +
p
(1  p)2 +
1
2
  2b and
d
(3)
0 = 1 
1  2pp (4b+ p  4bp)
2 (1  p) :
Note that if b! 0 then d(3)0 ! 12 = E():
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 7. If the optimal delegation set D has type 2, D =
 f20   d0g [ d0;  ; d0 we
must have b  20  d0: If b < 20  d0 then consider the set eD = hb; 20   d0i [ d0;  ; d0 : This
set of type 3 improves Vinf leaving V0 unchanged.
Consider the rst-order condition with respect to d0 for a set D =
 f20   d0g [ d0;  ; d0 of
type 2. The derivative @V0
@d0
=  (d0   E()   b): In order to prove that d0 < E() + b we have to
show that @Vinf
@d0
< 0; where
Vinf =  1  p
2
264 
0Z

(20   d0      b)2 dF () +
d0Z
0
(d0      b)2dF () +
Z
d0
b2dF ()
375 :
The derivative
@Vinf
@d0
=  1  p
2
242bF (0)  bF (d0)  
0Z

F ()d +
d0Z
0
F ()d
35 =
9
 1  p
2
2642bF (0)  bF (d0)  2
0 d0Z

F ()d  
0Z
20 d0
F ()d +
d0Z
0
F ()d
375
Since b  20   d0 and the function F () is log-concave we have by (4)
@Vi
@d0
  1  p
2
2642bF (0)  bF (d0)  bF (20   d0)  
0Z
20 d0
F ()d +
d0Z
0
F ()d
375 < 0:
For a contract of type 3 we have immediately
@V3
@d0
=  1  p
2
2642bF (0)  bF (d0)  bF (20   d0)  
0Z
20 d0
F ()d +
d0Z
0
F ()d
375 < 0:
Proof of Corollary 1. 1. If d0 < b we can consider the delegation set bD: Since we have b < E()+b;
the set bD () strictly improves V0 and Vinf : Note that q0 = b only if p = 0:
2. If d1 > b; then we can consider the set eD = hb; d1i [ d0;  ; d0 which has the same
uninformed decision d0 and strictly improves Vinf :
3. Taking the derivative with respect to d1 we obtain d1 = b:
Proof of Proposition 2. The payo¤ functions corresponding to each of types 1-3 are given by
V1 (d0; b) =  p
2
Z 

(d0      b)2 dF ()  1  p
2
264 d0Z

(d0      b)2dF () +
Z
d0
b2dF ()
375 :
V2 (d0; b) =  p
2
Z 

(d0      b)2 dF ()  1  p
2
24 E()Z

(2E()  d0      b)2dF ()+
d0Z
E()
(d0      b)2dF () +
Z
d0
b2dF ()
375
V3 (d0; b) =  p
2
Z 

(d0      b)2 dF ()  1  p
2
264 bZ

(b      b)2dF ()+
2E() d0Z
b
b2dF () +
E()Z
2E() d0
(2E()  d0      b)2dF () +
d0Z
E()
(d0      b)2dF () +
Z
d0
b2dF ()
375
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Consider b > b2; then using the rst-order condition
@V1
@d0
(d
(1)
0 (b) ; b) = 0 and (6) we have
@V2
@d0
(d
(1)
0 ) = F (E())
24R E() F () d
F (E())
  b
35 < 0:
For any xed b; V2 (d0; b) is a convex function of d0 and @V2@d0 (d
(2)
0 (b) ; b) = 0: Hence d
(1)
0 (b) >
d
(2)
0 (b) for all b 2 [b2; bmax] :
Consider Vinf(b) = Vinf(d
(i)
0 (b) ; b) as functions of b: Using the Envelope theorem the derivative
of V1(b) is
dV1(b)
db
= b(1  p)(1  F (d(1)0 )) (7)
and
dV2(b)
db
= b(1 p)
"
 2
 
E()  d(2)0 (b)

F (E()) 
 
bF (E()) 
Z E()

F () d
!!
(1  F (d(2)0 ))
#
:
By (6) we have dV1(b)
db
> dV2(b)
db
for all b 2 [b2; bmax] : Note that V1(d(1)0 (b2) ; b2) = V2(d(1)0 (b2) ; b2):
For b  b2 consider the delegation set of type 1 D (b) =
h
d
(1)
0 (b) ; 
i
; d
(1)
0 (b)

and of type 2
D0 (b) =

2E()  d(1)0 (b)

[
h
d
(1)
0 (b) ; 
i
; d
(1)
0 (b)

. We have V0 (D) = V0 (D0) : Hence
V2(D
0(b); b)  V1(D(b); b) = 1  p
2
E()Z

h
(d
(1)
0 (b)     b)2   (2E()  d(1)0 (b)     b)2
i
f()d =
2 (1  p)
E()Z

(d
(1)
0 (b)  E()) (E()     b) f()d = 2p(d(1)0 (b)  E())
E()Z

(E()     b) f()d:
Note that for b = b2 we have
E()Z

(E()     b2) f()d = 0: Thus V2(d(2)0 (b2) ; b2)  V2(d(1)0 (b2) ; b2) =
V1(d
(1)
0 (b

2) ; b

2): Therefore there exist b2  b2 such that V2(d(2)0 (b2) ; b2) = V1(d(1)0 (b2) ; b2): Similarly
we establish that V3(d
(3)
0 (b) ; b) > V2(d
(2)
0 (b) ; b) for b 2 [0; b1) :
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